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COMMENTARY
In January 2008, just before the Chinese Lunar New Year, 21 of China’s 31 provinces were hit by an unexpected snowstorm. This large-scale 
snow was most intense in the usually warm southern 
China and the storm caused unprecedented havoc 
for millions of holiday travelers. While the direct 
economic damage was estimated to be $21 billion, 
the subsequent bill for infrastructure repairs, living 
allowances, and agricultural production restoration 
totaled nearly $35 billion. More than 100 million 
people throughout the country were directly im-
pacted and more than 129 people died. This snow 
disaster tested the newly established Chinese emer-
gency response system and exposed the weaknesses 
of the current risk management system. 
China has long been a country plagued by natu-
ral disasters, but in today’s more interconnected 
world, Chinese and international journalists, as 
well as Chinese bloggers are quick to disseminate 
information on earthquakes, ﬂoods, and landslides, 
as well as the growing number of serious pollu-
tion accidents, major disease outbreaks, and food 
safety incidents. Thus, the Chinese government has 
come under increasing pressure to show adequate 
responses to all types of major emergencies. The 
snow disaster offered Chinese ofﬁcials many im-
portant lessons that were useful in responding to 
the subsequent earthquake in Sichuan Province in 
May of 2008. 
CHINA RECEIVES A “VICIOUS 
SLAP FROM MOTHER NATURE”
As the Chinese New Year approached in January of 
2008, many in China viewed the upcoming year as 
an exciting one with the summer Olympic Games 
opening in Beijing. Ironically, on January 10, just as 
many were speculating about excessively hot weather 
for the Games and with no warning from China’s 
Meteorological Administration, the country was hit 
by a massive snowstorm. This snow marked China’s 
coldest winter in 50 years and even in the past 100 
years in some regions (Zheng, 2008). In total, 21 
provinces in China were hit by snow and icy rain. 
(See Map 1). The icy rain and snow lingered for 
more than 30 days and even provinces that rarely re-
ceive excessive snow—such as Hunan and Hubei—
were blanketed in heavy snow. The total number of 
consecutive days of icy rain broke the record in 56 
counties of Guizhou Province (“Consecutive days,” 
2008). With more than half of a meter (18 inches), 
this storm shattered snow accumulation records from 
1951 in parts of six provinces. 
This snow disaster overwhelmed the Chinese 
transport and energy systems, wreaked havoc on 
food and agriculture, and tested China’s ﬂedgling 
risk management system. The snow halted all New 
Year’s travel in the southern provinces, leaving ﬁve 
million travelers—from what is the world’s larg-
est annual migration—stranded. More than 2,850 
trains were postponed, and over 3,000 ﬂights can-
celled and 5,550 delayed in the 15 days follow-
ing the snowstorm. The travel woes hit hardest in 
Guangzhou, where more than one million migrant 
workers waited in the cold for nearly two weeks 
for trains to resume service—for most, trains did 
not start soon enough to return home (“Dynamic 
news,” 2008). 
Many more people in China experienced a cold 
and dark New Year’s festival without electricity. 
Some 8,000 freight trains were delayed, trig-
gering the country’s most serious power crisis as 
coal deliveries languished on stranded trains. A 
large number of power lines and towers collapsed 
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under the heavy snow and ice. Parts of central 
and eastern China saw the worst power failures 
in the country’s history. Nineteen provinces and 
regions suffered blackouts with some areas losing 
electricity for nearly two weeks, as was the case in 
Chenzhou, a city of 4.5 million people in Hunan 
Province (“Notice of the State Council,” 2008). In 
Guangdong, emergency supplies of coal arrived on 
a ﬂeet of 125 cargo ships. 
Although most Chinese citizens blamed se-
vere winter weather for the power crisis, policy-
makers are now being forced to admit their own 
role in the crisis by imposing low, state-set elec-
tricity fees that cause power generators to run in 
the red as coal prices leap. Recent crackdowns on 
small, unsafe coal mines also led to rising coal 
prices and shortages. With enormous efforts 
and investments, on February 6, 2008—almost 
a month after the storm began—power was re-
stored at least partly to 164 of the 169 counties, 
including the most affected city of Chenzhou 
(“Electricity back,” 2008). The energy problems 
following the snow crisis catalyzed more aggres-
sive laws and standards to push for energy efﬁ-
ciency. A stronger amended Energy Conservation 
Law went into effect on April 1, 2008, and 46 
national energy-saving standards were promul-
gated and implemented in the months following 
the snow disaster.
IMPROVING THE CHINESE RISK 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Of course, it is easy to criticize China’s energy and 
transportation sectors for poor infrastructure and 
design ﬂaws that could not withstand the snow-
storm. The political institutions also exacerbated 
the problems—most notable were the failures of the 
weather forecasting system to provide early warn-
ing of the snow and the subsequent slow responses 
of the central and local governments. However, it 
is more important to understand the fundamental 
institutional and management causes behind these 
problems. Learning from globally established mod-
els, a national risk management system should be 
based on the principles of prevention, prepared-
ness, response, and recovery. The recent snowstorm 
tested the effectiveness of the country’s nascent risk 
management system and indicated that many im-
provements are needed. Before reﬂecting on future 
changes, it is helpful to examine recent natural and 
pollution disasters that have shaped the Chinese 
government’s actions in creating better emergency 
response and risk assessment systems. 
Major Pollution Incidents and SARS 
Catalyze New Planning and Laws
China has been jolted by a series of pollution ac-
cidents and major disease outbreaks in recent 
years—such as the heavily reported Severe Acute 
Map 1:  Provinces and regions affected by the snowstorms 
and icy rains in China in January 2008
Source: Authors
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Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003, 
followed by the serious emergence of avian ﬂu, the 
chemical spill into the Songhua River in 2005, and 
the toxic algae blooms on Lake Tai in 2007. The 
central government paid closer attention to emer-
gency response capacity building after the SARS 
outbreak, which led to 685 deaths within China 
(including Mainland, Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan) and 89 abroad. The Chinese government’s 
initial cover-up and later mishandling of the out-
break led to considerable unwanted scrutiny, which 
prompted the formulation in 2003 of more than 100 
emergency response plans at various levels in China. 
However, most of these were sector or subject-based 
(e.g., Emergency Response Plan for Public Incidents of 
Beijing Municipality, National Emergency Response 
Plan for Environmental Incidents) rather than in-
tegrated plans. Most problematic is the fact that 
these were quickly prepared campaign-style plans 
rather than true institution-building mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the current emergency management 
system focuses only on the responses to past disas-
ters rather than anticipated or unseen crises.
On the heels of the November 2005 Songhua 
River chemical spill, China’s State Council passed 
initial measures to establish a formal emergency 
management system, mainly dealing with natural 
disasters, catastrophic incidents, public health, and 
social security issues. On January 8, 2006, when 
the State Council ofﬁcially issued the National 
Emergency Response Plan, all the provinces and mu-
nicipalities had completed their plans, which pro-
vided guidelines for ofﬁcials dealing with different 
emergencies. These guidelines boosted China’s cri-
sis management capacity. The Emergency Response 
Law, which came into effect on November 1, 
2007, put into effect the principals of “protecting 
the security of public lives and property and res-
cuing humans after sudden incidents.” About two 
months later, the new law was challenged by the 
snowstorm. Effective responses to this snow disas-
ter demanded coordinated and integrated measures 
between transportation, power, and communica-
tion sectors and public health authorities. However, 
as the emergency response plans remained simply 
principles on paper, it is not surprising that mis-
communication and inaction by some government 
authorities were observed during the snow disaster. 
Struggles in Top-Down Coordination 
Arguably, a formal institutional network for com-
prehensive emergency management was non-
existent in China before SARS, which was a major 
shortcoming that the central government tried 
to address by creating the National Emergency 
Response Ofﬁce (NERO) to act as a liaison be-
tween the State Council and other governmental 
authorities in 2006 right after the Songhua spill. 
Although NERO is responsible for coordination 
among different organizations and mobilizing re-
sources needed in cases of emergency, given its 
limited capacity and authority, it performed poorly 
during the snowstorm. For example, NERO did not 
issue the “Notice of Low Temperatures and Heavy 
Snow” until January 21. 
The poor coordination during the snowstorm 
led the State Council to set up an ad hoc national 
Command Center on January 28 (nearly three 
weeks after the snow started) to coordinate relief 
work and direct operations in the coal, oil, and 
power sectors (“The State Council,” 2008). Six of-
ﬁces were established under the Command Center 
during the ﬁrst three days and dealt with the fol-
lowing areas: (1) transportation of coal, power, 
and oil; (2) road repairs; (3) power line repairs; (4) 
rescue and market safeguards; (5) post-disaster res-
toration; and (6) news media and public outreach. 
These ofﬁces marked an important model for bet-
ter disaster preparedness, as was demonstrated dur-
ing the earthquake in Sichuan in May 2008.
During the Sichuan earthquake (Wenchuan 
earthquake) the government coordinated a na-
tional ﬁrst-class response to the disaster. The State 
Council’s Earthquake Relief Headquarters, headed 
by Premier Wen Jiabao, was established several 
hours after the earthquake. Eight working groups 
dealing with rescue, forecast and monitoring, medi-
cine and sanitation, infrastructure, production re-
covery, living resettlement, security, and publicity 
were organized rapidly. Although NERO played an 
active part in collecting and releasing information 
(e.g., number of deaths), it did not act as a leading 
organ or coordinating backbone in the disaster re-
lief. Although the ad hoc response center did func-
tion well, ideally the Chinese government should 
have empowered NERO—potentially drawing 
on the experiences of American and European 
systems—to become a more effective manage-
ment system covering prevention, preparedness, re-
sponse, and recovery, and the formulation of strate-
gic guidelines for risk management. NERO and its 
provincial counterparts also need speciﬁc training 
to enhance the management skills and understand-
ing of risk management.
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Using the principles of prevention, preparedness, 
response, and recovery, Table 1 outlines some of 
the weaknesses of China’s emergency management 
system in response to two pollution incidents (the 
Songhua River chemical spill and the Lake Taialgae 
bloom) and two major natural disasters (the snow-
storm in southern China and the Wenchuan earth-
quake). All four cases took place within the past 
four years and each demonstrated insufﬁcient pre-
vention and inadequate preparation. 
Uneven News Reporting
Apart from the important role of the government, 
a quick response from the news media is crucial 
for decision-making and communication with the 
public when a disaster occurs. A review of the news 
records by Chinese Central Television (CCTV) 
shows that 68 ‘snow’ news items were released 
from January 11 to 31, of which only 8 articles 
were published during the ﬁrst 10 days. Strikingly, 
no news was reported between January 14 and 16. 
These gaps in reporting may be linked to the re-
strictions placed on journalists after the Songhua 
River incident, during which the Chinese news 
media responded quickly and carried out fairly 
critical investigative reporting into failings by local 
governments in preventing and reporting the ac-
cident. Following the Songhua incident journalists 
were required to get permission from editors before 
reporting on environmental accidents and natural 
disasters. China’s news outlets are often ordered 
not to report on such crises. In contrast to the news 
media during the Songhua River spill, none of the 
news content during the snow disaster was critical 
about the performances of the local governments 
in the crisis. Moreover, some news stories were 
even misleading. For instance, the news reports 
on January 23 declared that the train system was 
back in order, causing thousands of passengers to 
push back into the Guangzhou railway station even 
though the trains were not yet running normally. 
During the snowstorm the public’s right-to-know 
was not fully protected. The passage of the 2008 
Open Information Measures did lift some of the 
restrictions on journalists. If the news media in 
China can play its proper role in disaster communi-
cation, the Chinese people would beneﬁt from bet-
ter decision-making. 
However, the situation is changing, as can be 
seen in the Wenchuan earthquake just 12 days after 
the Decree of Government Information Openness was 
put into effect on May 1, 2008. Notably the new 
open environmental information measures passed 
on the same day made misleading and restricted 
reporting illegal, allowing for much freer reporting 
during the earthquake. As Table 1 noted, the re-
sponse time and access to information linked to the 
Wenchuan earthquake was signiﬁcantly better than 
what occurred in previous disasters. Ultimately, 
timely and sufﬁcient information played a crucial 
role in decision-making for rescuing people and 
mitigating losses following the earthquake (“Three 
breakthroughs,” 2008).
CONSIDERING THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND HEALTH IMPACTS OF 
THE SNOW CRISIS
This crisis also raised questions about environmen-
tal and ecological protection in China. Scientists 
say the snowstorms in China were not directly 
linked to climate change, but simply an extreme 
event caused by very cold winter temperatures and 
a La Niña weather pattern. However, the devastat-
ing snowstorms show that China and rest of the 
world must prepare for possibly increasing and new 
types of disasters. The storm underlined the need 
for greater global cooperation on global weather 
forecasting. Following the lead of many countries 
that set up key bodies on climate change, China 
should identify and support science to provide reli-
able forecasting.
The snowstorms also indicated a need for energy 
efﬁciency, which could have helped maintain power 
to affected areas, and green technology to help 
in disaster relief. Regarding the latter point, dur-
ing the snowstorm an average of 60,000-100,000 
tons of chemical snow-thawing agents were used 
in each of the affected provinces. Some research-
ers have pointed out that the use of these chemical 
snow-thawing agents has polluted drinking water, 
damaged or even destroyed plants and animals, 
and increased saline in soils in Guangdong, Anhui, 
Jiangsu and Hubei provinces (Peng & Lai, 2008; 
Wang, 2008). 
The direct and indirect ecological impacts of 
the snowstorm also should not be ignored, espe-
cially on forest ecosystems. One-tenth of China’s 
total forested area was destroyed in the snowstorm, 
which resulted in habitat loss and starvation of 
many kinds of wildlife (Pan, 2008). The potential, 
cumulative, and long-term effects of the storm on 
natural ecosystems will need further research to un-
derstand the full extent of the damage.
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Table 1: Weaknesses of the Risk Management 
System in Major Accidents in China
INCIDENT TIMELINE WEAKNESSES 
Songhua 
River 
Chemical 
Spill (2005)
13 November Explosion at a petrochemical 
plant in Jilin City, Jilin Province; ofﬁcials 
do not notify downstream Harbin city in 
Heilongjiang Province until eight days later.
21 November Harbin ofﬁcials cut off water 
to the city, initially explaining it was for 
routine maintenance, but public outcry 
leads to admission about the spill, catalyzes 
massive news media coverage.
22 November State media says water could 
have been contaminated after the blast; 
PLA sent in to bring water to Harbin.
23 November Authorities admit very high 
levels of benzene have been found in the 
water.
25 December The polluted water ﬂows into 
Russia.
Insufﬁcient prevention: Poor governance 
of chemical enterprises; unsound industrial 
arrangements; no alternative drinking water 
sources.
Lack of preparation: Petrochemical plant, 
provinces, and cities lack emergency plans, 
skills, and technologies to deal with pollution 
emergencies; no plans for industrial accidents 
or public information systems.
Bad response: Tight control of information in 
Jilin and Harbin; slow handling of the case; 
insufﬁcient communication with the public; 
uncoordinated government agencies at all 
levels; inappropriate mitigation measures; 
insufﬁcient emergency response equipment; 
uncooperative actions by some ofﬁcials.
Difﬁcult recovery: Studies of short-, medium-, 
and long-term impacts on human health 
should be conducted; survey of risk assess-
ment at a random sample of Chinese chemical 
factories needed; aquatic toxicity research 
should be promoted; cooperation and coor-
dination between China and Russia over the 
incident should be improved; lessons learned 
from the incident should be incorporated into 
legislation and policy enforcement.
Algae Bloom 
of Lake Tai 
Lake (2007)
7 April Blue-green algae fans out across 
Lake Tai.
25 April The algae bloom reaches Meiliang 
Bay in Lake Tai.
28 May A severe algae outbreak causes 
water quality to deteriorate, tap water be-
comes undrinkable for 2.3 million residents 
in Wuxi City, Jiangsu Province.
29 May Algae bloom threatens water for 
millions; local residents ﬂock to buy bottled 
water and bread; local governments take 
emergency response measures.
1 June The water quality improves; crisis is 
relieved for the short term.
4 June Water supplies are ﬁxed.
Insufﬁcient prevention: Too much industrial 
waste discharge; poor governance of industry 
and agriculture; no alternative drinking water 
sources.
Inadequate preparation: Shortage of pure 
water; undeveloped emergency response 
plans and technologies.
Imperfect response: Timely yet ineffective (or 
short-term) solutions; completely inaccurate 
labeling of the algae bloom as a “natural 
disaster;” lack of collaboration at all levels of 
government.
Long-term recovery: Uncoordinated govern-
ment agencies for Lake Tai pollution control; 
aggressive long-term recovery strategy.
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Table 1 (continued)
INCIDENT TIMELINE WEAKNESSES 
Snowstorm 
in Southern 
China (2008)
10 January Epic snowstorms start to slam central and 
southern China.
22 January The National Emergency Response Ofﬁce 
(NERO) releases an urgent notice for preparation and 
relief of the snow disaster.
25 January Snow disasters exacerbate; trains and  
aircraft in southern China are almost completely  
paralyzed. 
26 January Coal shortage; 19 provinces and regions  
suffer blackouts. 
27 January More than 100,000 passengers stranded at 
Guangzhou Railway Station; the China Meteorological 
Administration issues a red alert warning of more 
snowstorms and blizzards in central and eastern China.
28 January The snowstorm spreads to 14 provinces and 
cities in China, affecting nearly 100 million people.
29 January The China Meteorological Administration 
issues its second red alert warning. 
1 February The disaster relief and emergency command 
center under the State Council is established. 
5 February The snow stops. 
6 February Snow-plagued residents in central Chinese 
cities bid farewell to darkness. 
9 February China’s snowstorm-hit areas begin to recover 
gradually.
Insufﬁcient prevention: Incomplete 
road systems; unsuitable power 
transmission lines; antiquated and 
inefﬁcient power grid; vulnerable 
infrastructure; inadequate energy 
supply; inadequate emergency con-
sciousness and knowledge among 
ofﬁcials and citizens.
Lack of preparation: Overburdened 
railways; uncoordinated govern-
ment response from the top down; 
separate and narrow emergency 
response plans; uneven news report-
ing; unsatisfactory weather forecast 
system.
Slow response: Ineffective response 
measures; uncoordinated actions; 
poor communication with the 
public; ineffective alarm system; 
uncoordinated mechanism for 
sudden incidents; nontransparent 
information.
Difﬁcult recovery: Slow recovery of 
power lines and grids on a large-
scale; damage to agricultural and 
industrial production. 
Wenchuan 
Earthquake 
(2008)
14:28 Beijing time, 12 May A massive earthquake 
measuring 8.0 on the Richter scale strikes Wenchuan 
County, Sichuan Province. 
15:40 Beijing time, 12 May National Emergency 
Response Plan started up.
21:00 Beijing time, 12 May The Command Center for 
Disaster-Relief of the State Council is established; 
Premier Wen Jiabao is the commander; eight working 
groups are organized.
12-15 May A 72-hour period of relief; troops arrive in 
the affected areas. 
4-8 June “Regulations on Post-Wenchuan Earthquake 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction” adopted at the 11th 
executive meeting of the State Council on June 4 and 
come into effect on June 8.
Insufﬁcient prevention: Poorly 
constructed buildings; inadequate 
relief materials; unsuitable urban 
planning.
Inadequate preparation: 
Unsatisfactory earthquake predic-
tion system; impractical emergency 
response plans. 
Timely response and open in-
formation: Effective anti-crisis 
strategy: Command, Control and 
Communication; uncoordinated and 
highly helpful spontaneous citizen 
assistance and donations. 
Hard recovery: Integrated post-
earthquake evaluation needed; ex-
tensive reconstruction of infrastruc-
ture; human health and psychologi-
cal therapy required; catastrophe 
models research needed.
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In the background of natural and anthropo-
centric environmental changes, sufﬁcient public 
awareness and general knowledge about risks can 
help reduce damage during disasters. The public 
should learn about different weather events, their 
causes and effects, and the regions most likely to 
experience them. Surveying and researching pub-
lic health is necessary for building disaster response 
and prevention capacity within public medicine 
and sanitation organizations (“The retrospective 
survey,”2008). 
FUTURE CONCERNS
In order to ensure people’s health and safety in snow 
affected areas, the governments had to take precau-
tious measures to prevent the outbreak of infectious 
diseases. Geological disasters resulting from melting 
snow should be closely monitored because there are 
many mountains in southern China where landslide 
accidents often take place. Between January and 
March 2008 more than 2,000 instances of snow-
melt-induced landslides occurred across Hunan, 
Hubei, Anhui, Guangxi, Guizhou, and Jiangxi prov-
inces. One major landslide took place in Sichuan 
two months after the snowstorm (March 22), which 
caused seven deaths (CIGEM, 2008). 
The snow also called into question whether the 
Chinese government can successfully control in-
ﬂation. The low temperatures and snow destroyed 
many vegetable, tea, grain, and fruit crops in 
China’s usually temperate south, leading to food 
scarcity and higher prices. Clearly China’s risk 
management system needs to include solutions on 
how to recover agricultural production following a 
severe weather disaster. 
The disaster took a short-term toll on China’s 
economy. However, the snow has also exposed 
deeper structural problems in the economy. Massive 
transportation bottlenecks and power shortages are 
a reminder that, despite years of intense growth, 
China still has a tremendous need for investment in 
roads and other infrastructure. Those issues will not 
melt away with the snow and dealing with these 
weaknesses is a crucial part of a truly comprehen-
sive risk management system.
Like the SARS outbreak, the snowstorm and 
earthquake incidents temporarily slowed the econ-
omy and caused short-term pain. In the past, the 
Chinese government has used ad hoc measures to 
adequately respond to the immediate impacts of 
disasters, but more needs to be done to coordinate 
agencies, improve follow through after initial crises, 
and take measures to better anticipate disasters. 
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